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Abstract  
 
Based on the premise that there is not a single fiscal multiplier and that economic 
environment impact on fiscal policy effectiveness, this dissertation aims to find out if income 
inequality may also be called a determinant for fiscal multipliers.  
Throughout this work it is presented a vast literature review on the determinants of fiscal 
multipliers; on economic features affecting income inequality and, last but not least, on a 
more direct link between fiscal policy and inequality. The goal is to find out the mechanisms 
through which, directly or indirectly, income inequality affects the fiscal multiplier. 
Additionally, using a set of European Union countries, fiscal multipliers were computed and 
the relationship between them and income inequality was established. 
This dissertation contributes to the existing literature in the following: i) a critical analysis 
of theoretical mechanisms that link the income inequality to the fiscal policy effectiveness; 
ii) an empirical analysis of the impact of this country specific feature on fiscal multipliers, 
accounting for fiscal policies both on spending and revenue side.    
Using a vector autoregressive model for a set of European countries during the period 
2002 to 2017 (quarterly data) we compute fiscal multipliers. Then using that results it was 
analysed the behaviour of fiscal multipliers depending on income inequality. The main results 
point to an effective impact of income inequality on fiscal policy effectiveness when also 
accounting for other multiplier determinants and different results depending on the side of 
the fiscal policy. 
 
 
JEL Code: D31; E21; E62 
Keywords: Income inequality; Fiscal policy; Fiscal multiplier. 
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Resumo 
 
Com base na premissa de que não existe um único multiplicador orçamental e que 
diferentes fatores económicos afetam a eficácia da política orçamental, esta dissertação tem 
como objetivo perceber se a desigualdade de rendimentos também pode ser considerada um 
desses determinantes.  
Ao longo deste trabalho apresenta-se uma vasta revisão de literatura sobre os 
determinantes dos multiplicadores orçamentais; sobre características das economias que 
afetam a desigualdade de rendimentos e, finalmente, sobre a relação mais direta, 
anteriormente estudada na literatura económica, entre a política fiscal e a desigualdade. Esta 
dissertação pretende identificar os mecanismos através dos quais, direta ou indiretamente, a 
desigualdade de rendimentos afeta o multiplicador orçamental. Adicionalmente, usando um 
conjunto de países da União Europeia, foram estimados os multiplicadores orçamentais e foi 
estabelecida a relação entre os mesmos e a desigualdade de rendimentos. 
Os contributos desta dissertação para a literatura centram-se: i) numa análise crítica dos 
mecanismos teóricos que relacionam a desigualdade de rendimentos e a eficácia da política 
orçamenta; e ii) numa análise empírica do impacto desta característica, específica de cada 
país, nos multiplicadores orçamentais, quer do lado despesa quer do lado da receita. 
Usando um modelo de vetores autorregressivos para um conjunto de países europeus 
durante o período 2002-2017 (dados trimestrais), foram calculados os multiplicadores fiscais. 
Usando esses resultados, analisou-se o comportamento dos multiplicadores orçamentais 
dependendo do nível de desigualdade de rendimentos. Os principais resultados apontam para 
um impacto da desigualdade de rendimentos sobre a eficácia da política orçamental, quando 
considerados outros determinantes dos multiplicadores na regressão, e resultados diferentes 
que dependem do facto de ser considerado um multiplicador da despesa ou da receita. 
 
Códigos JEL: D31; E21; E62 
Palavras-chave: Desigualdade de rendimentos; Política orçamental; Multiplicador 
orçamental. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The 2008 financial crisis, leading to the global economic crisis, left the economies, 
particularly developed economies, in deep and long-to-recover recessions. This unstable 
framework reminds us the importance of macro policies for stabilization. It is crucial to 
understand the effects and the effectiveness of the policies adopted, especially those 
associated with fiscal policies that are, for countries with a fixed exchange rate regime or in 
a monetary union, essential to ease the adjustments to asymmetric (effects of) shocks.  
At the same time, accordingly to IMF (2014, p. 4), income inequality “has increased in both 
advanced and developing economies in the last ten decades”. Martínez-Vázquez et al. (2012), based on 
data from the World Income Inequality Database, conclude that, after having stabilized in 
the mid-1980s, inequality has increased dramatically, especially in the beginning of the 1990s, 
both in developing and developed countries. There are several views on what the causes for 
this increase are (for instance, Piketty and Saez (2014) assign it to the rise of the global 
competition for skills), and on what should be done to reduce this inequality. Fiscal policy 
plays a key role in trying to reduce income inequality through instruments such as taxes, 
social transfers and some other government expenditures related, for example, with 
education and health care (e.g., Bastagli et al., 2012; Martínez-Vázquez et al., 2012). However, 
the focus of this dissertation is not on the impact of fiscal policy on income inequality, but 
instead on the impact of income inequality in the effectiveness of the fiscal policy. 
A substantial amount of research has been done covering for fiscal policy effectiveness 
and the impacts of fiscal policy on macroeconomic aggregates (for a survey on these impacts 
see, for example, Hebous, 2011). It is now well established in the literature that there is not 
a single fiscal multiplier1 but that, instead, fiscal policy effectiveness is state-dependent, 
namely reacting differently to several structural features of the economy or even to cycle 
phases (e.g., Corsetti et al., 2012, and Ilzetzki et al., 2013). 
However, still, almost every author analyses this theme focusing on aggregate effects 
while overlooking heterogeneity in income among agents. Thus the results may be biased 
since different agents respond differently to fiscal shocks as recent results presented in the 
literature show (e.g., Anderson et al., 2016, and Kruger et al., 2016). 
                                                          
1 The fiscal multiplier is broadly defined as “the change in real GDP or other output measure caused by one-unit increase 
in a fiscal variable” (Ilzetzky et al., 2013, p. 244). 
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Firstly motivated by the findings in Brinca et al. (2016) - that provide evidence for a 
positive relationship between wealth inequality and the size of the government spending 
multiplier -, but also because there is no comprehensive set of literature explaining the 
mechanisms through which income inequality may shape the size, or even the sign, of fiscal 
multipliers, this dissertation aims to address the following questions: i) does income 
inequality affect fiscal policy effectiveness?; and, more specifically, ii) what are the 
mechanisms acting in the transmission of income inequality to fiscal multipliers? 
In order to answer the previous questions, we perform a literature review which intends 
to identify economic mechanisms through which income inequality may directly, but also 
indirectly, affect fiscal policy effectiveness. By indirectly, we mean that having recognized the 
existence of such relation, we should also notice how inequality is affected by some economic 
factors (for instance, Krueger et al., 2010, relates inequality with business cycle phases), 
relating these factors with the fiscal multiplier. Moreover, another goal is to understand if 
these transmission channels differ, for example, among different fiscal policy instruments 
(e.g., taxes vs government spending). Since, in this regard, the literature is rather vague and, 
as far as we know, no detailed analysis exists on the theoretical models supporting this 
relation, an encompassing literature review is a first contribution of this work.2 The analysis 
bypassing income inequality will allow us to propose some additional explanations on why 
multipliers are state-dependent.  
Furthermore, we formulate an empirical evaluation of the impact of income inequality 
on fiscal multipliers, considering different fiscal instruments and using panel data for 
European countries. To the best of our knowledge only Brinca et al. (2016) and Brinca et al. 
(2017) establish a direct relationship between income inequality and fiscal multipliers, and 
both studies left behind some fiscal instruments and overlooked some transmission 
mechanisms. The empirical analysis is based in a two parts approach, similarly to the 
methodology followed by Brinca et al. (2016), where we compute a VAR model followed by 
a least squares estimation.  
From the estimation performed we get the following results: (1) it seems that income 
inequality actually affects the effectiveness of fiscal policy; (2) the impact depends on what 
is the instrument in analysis. According to these results there is a meaningful trade-off 
                                                          
2 Although there is a vast literature on the effects of fiscal policy on income inequality, the opposite relation 
has not been much explored. 
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between fiscal policy effectiveness and income inequality, so this should be consider for 
policy decision purposes. 
The present dissertation is structured as follows. In the next section it will be presented 
a summary of the literature review to clarify the main concepts and to introduce the 
theoretical framework in which this work arises. In section 3, we will briefly describe the 
methodology and data used on this dissertation. After that we present, in section 4, the results 
from the estimations performed and we analyse them based on economic literature. Finally, 
in section 5, we conclude summing up the results and pointing lacks to be explored in future 
works.  
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2. Literature Review  
2.1. Fiscal multipliers 
2.1.1. Definition of fiscal multiplier 
 
Macroeconomic policy is a long-discussed subject, over the years many theories have 
been exploit. Since the discussion between the Keynesian and the neoclassic school until the 
fresher real business cycle models and new Keynesian models, one of the main goal of 
macroeconomists is to understand the economic response to policy shocks and to take 
advantage of the more effective policies.  
Samuelson (1951, p. 395) defined fiscal policy as a “process of shaping public taxation and 
public expenditure so as (1) to help dampen down the swings of the business cycle and (2) to contribute toward 
the maintenance of a progressive, high employment economy free from excessive inflation or deflation”.  
For the purpose of accomplishing the goals mentioned above, there are several fiscal 
instruments used, each of which with different impacts. Governments can apply policies 
both on expenditure side and on revenue side, being the main instruments current public 
spending, public investment, transfers and taxes. We should take into consideration how 
different instruments may have different impacts. For instance, Afonso and Sousa (2012) 
attribute small but positive effects on GDP, varied effects on private consumption and 
investment, a positive effect on housing prices, a quick fall in stock prices and, in general, a 
positive effect on price level and on interest rate to government positive shocks on the 
spending side. When it comes to the effects of a shock on the revenue side, they recognize 
positive impact on GDP and private investment, varied effect on consumption, varied 
impact on housing price, positive effect on stock prices, and mixed effects on interest rate.  
Whatever the instruments, it is crucial to measure the effectiveness of the policy.  Usually 
the effectiveness of fiscal policy is assessed in terms of changes in gross domestic product 
(GDP), through the computation of fiscal multipliers. The fiscal multiplier is broadly defined 
as “the change in real GDP or other output measure caused by one-unit increase in a fiscal variable” 
(Ilzetzky et al., 2013, p. 244). Thus fiscal multipliers can be as many as the number of fiscal 
instruments. Moreover, fiscal multipliers can be computed to different forecast horizons. 
Ilzetzky et al. (2013) define impact multiplier as the change in output, per unit change in the 
fiscal instrument, produced in the moment the shock in the fiscal variable occurs. Also called 
instantaneous multiplier (Coenen et al., 2012), it is adequate to measure the impacts of 
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temporary shocks. In turn, cumulative multiplier refers to the net present value of the 
cumulative change in output, per unit change in the fiscal instrument, due to a shock in a 
fiscal variable that occurred some periods before. Cumulative multipliers are not only useful 
to measure short run effects but also permanent fiscal stimulus shocks (Coenen et al., 2012). 
 
2.1.2. The effectiveness of fiscal policy: the size of fiscal multipliers 
 
The literature on the determinants of the effectiveness of fiscal policy, meaning the 
factors that influence the size of fiscal multipliers, is way too vast. Batini et al. (2014) starts 
by distinguish structural factors (country specific characteristics that influence the response 
to fiscal policy) as trade openness, labour market rigidity, the size of automatic stabilizers, 
exchange rate regimes and debt level; and conjunctural factors (temporary factors that deviate 
the level of multipliers) as cycle phases and the degree of monetary accommodation.  
The impact of structural factors on the fiscal multiplier is widely approached among 
economists. Ilzetzki et al. (2013), using two criteria to define openness to trade, in the one 
hand legal restrictions (higher tariffs, less trade) and on the other hand economies dimension 
(larger dimension, less trade), identify smaller fiscal multipliers in opened economies in 
response to an increase in government consumption. They find negative multipliers for 
countries with high ratio trade-GDP both on short and long-run.  The results obtained for 
the different countries are attributed to the reduction of net exports instead of an increase in 
domestic production in result of a rise in net demand. Likewise, Batini et al. (2014) and Barrell 
et al. (2012) defend a less pronounced demand’s leakage for imports in large countries or 
countries only partially open to trade.  
Also, Batini et al. (2014) attribute larger multipliers to more rigid labour markets, since 
rigid wages tend to amplify the response of output to fiscal shocks. In agreement with this 
position, focusing on the New Deal cartelization policies (designed to increase labour 
bargaining power), Cole and Ohanian (2004) implement a multisector dynamic general 
equilibrium model and they conclude that those policies contributed to the persistent 
depression of the American economy on the 1930’s, even finding a match between the 
abandonment of these policies and the economic recovery of the 1940’s. Auerbach and 
Gorondnichenko (2012) also confirm more pronounced cyclical variation in fiscal multipliers 
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and higher response of output in recession when labour markets are more rigid, consistently 
with the previous authors. 
Still, regarding structural factors, larger automatic stabilizers are associated with reduced 
fiscal multipliers. Since automatic stabilizers are expected to smooth the business cycles, it is 
intuitive the inference made by Batini et al. (2014) and Dolls et al. (2012) that automatic 
response of transfers and taxes will offset the initial shock.   
Furthermore higher fiscal multipliers are often associated with fixed exchange rates (e.g., 
Corsetti et al., 2012; Ilzetzki et al., 2013; Batini et al., 2014). For economies with predetermined 
exchange rates, Ilzetzki et al. (2013) find multipliers in response to a shock in government 
consumption larger than one in the long-run, while in case of flexible exchange rates they 
find negative multipliers at any forecast horizon. The evidence of higher public spending 
multipliers under fixed exchange rate regimes are in line with Mundell- Fleming model 
predictions, according to which the exchange rate movements offset the impact of 
discretionary fiscal policy. Even though that is coherent, some authors, for instance Corsetti 
et al. (2012), Born et al. (2013), or Ilzetzki et al. (2013), question the transmission mechanism 
stated in the Mundell-Fleming model. They relate some of the differences (to the model 
predictions) with a possible monetary accommodation of the fiscal policy.      
Lastly, the association between high debt levels and effectiveness of fiscal policy, since 
this feature impact economic agents’ expectations. Sutherland (1997), focusing on the link 
between government debt and the expected distribution of taxes across generations finds 
that the impact of debt depends on its level. He points Keynesian effects (deficit as 
expansionary) for low credit levels since agents believe that stabilisation programs will not 
affect their generation. However, with high debt levels he finds contractionary behaviour due 
to the imminent threat of a debt stabilisation. Concurring to the non-Keynesian effects, 
Kirchner et al. (2010) conclude that high-debt levels affect long term multipliers negatively. 
Also, Huidrom et al. (2016) go further and find out that the effects of fiscal positions (related 
with government debt and deficits) are separate and distinct from business cycle. They accept 
the explanation given by the previous authors, calling it “Ricardian channel”, but they also 
present an “interest rate channel” through which the borrowing costs get higher due to a 
major perception of credit risks by the investors. 
A structural characteristic not mentioned until now but also affecting the size of the fiscal 
multiplier is the level of development of a country. Ilzetzki et al. (2013) attribute larger 
multipliers to industrial countries, and they perceive not only differences on the effects but 
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also on execution, since high-income economies’ spending government shocks tend to be 
more persistent. According to Batini et al. (2014, p. 6) this may be related with “expenditure 
inefficiencies, the difficulty to unwind expenditures (with increases more likely to become permanent), or 
composition effects”. Easterly and Rebelo (1993) point the different policy instruments used by 
countries depending on their level of development. They state higher reliance on 
international trade taxes of poor countries, while income taxes are more important to 
developed countries. 
On conjunctural factors side, a consensual opinion of business cycle phases’ impact on 
fiscal policy’s effectiveness is presented in several works over the past years (e.g., Auerbach 
and Gorodnichenko, 2012; Corsetti et al., 2012). They all recognised more effectiveness of 
fiscal policy during recessions than through expansions. Batini et al. (2014) claim that a fiscal 
stimulus is less effective in expansion due to a crowding out effect in private demand that 
may be explained by an inelastic resource’s curve, and a fiscal consolidation have more 
recessive impacts on downturn because credit-constrained agents cannot maintain their 
consumption. Michaillat (2011), on the effects of fiscal policy on unemployment over the 
business cycle, apply a model with job rationing in recession and find that the multilpier 
associated with the reduction of unemployement rate in response to an increase in public 
spending (through higher expenditures on public jobs or on wage subsidies) is positive and 
conterciclycal. Concluding that either hiring in the public sector or applying a wage subsidy, 
specially in recession, reduces the unemployment, another point of view but also in 
agreement with the hypothesis of higher multipliers in recession. Still related with the 
business cycles, Canzoneri et al. (2016) show that during recessions government spending, 
particularly when financed by debt, is more effective if there are contercyclical finantial 
frictions. The implicit mecanism rely on the believe that financial strapped agents react 
positively to government spending even when taking into consideration future taxes, and this 
wealth effect is larger when the financial constraint are more severe. The authors conjucture 
that if the focus of their research was the relaxation of borrowing constraints instead of  
spread movements the results would be the same.   
In addition, there are also some authors who discussed the interaction between fiscal 
policy and monetary policy. Coenen et al. (2012) find that the effects of fiscal stimulus in 
different instruments are larger with higher levels of monetary accommodation (excluding 
from this the effects of labour taxes). They explain the drop of fiscal multipliers, when there 
is not monetary accommodation, by the higher interest rates in response to higher inflation 
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(pattern effect for the different instruments analysed) and by higher taxes to service debt 
(referring this last effect as being more important in the long term). Also, several authors 
argue that at the Zero Lower Bound temporary increases on government spending will have 
a higher multiplier (e.g. Christiano et al., 2011). When the Zero Lower Bound is strictly 
binding, the nominal interest rate is stuck at zero, so the expected inflation caused by an 
increase on government spending will cause a decline on real interest rate and, consequently, 
a larger rise on output (Christiano et al., 2011).  
Additionally to the economic features mentioned above, it is also important to remember 
that different instruments have different impacts on output, and hence different 
effectiveness. According to several authors, such as Forni et al. (2009), Coenen et al. (2012) 
and Batini et al. (2014), there is a hierarchy of fiscal instruments according to macroeconomic 
models. Batini et al. (2014) summarizes this hierarchy looking both on spending side and on 
the revenue side. On the spending side the highest short-term multipliers are usually related 
to public investment, followed by government wages and intermediate consumption and, at 
bottom of the list, the untargeted transfers. On the revenue side usually a shock on 
consumption taxes perform better, also being called growth-friendly, these instruments 
improve the GDP, and a shock associated with corporate income taxes and personal income 
taxes have a worst impact, so lower multipliers due to more negative impacts on GDP. 
However empirically the results point to a different ordering, Batini et al. (2014) associate 
labour income taxes with multipliers higher than the ones resultant of corporate income taxes 
application and even output losses for consumption taxes and they only confirm larger 
multipliers associated with public investment in emerging countries. 
Coenen et al. (2012) highlight the channels through which different instruments affect 
the fiscal multipliers: while public investment and consumption shocks impact directly on 
the aggregate demand, taxes and transfers operate through personal disposable income, as 
well as incentives in cases of distortionary taxation.  
Finally, in cases of fiscal consolidation, Alesina et al. (2015) find higher output losses 
when they are based on taxes and they state especially low costs, in terms of output losses, 
when consolidations are based on spending cuts in a permanent way.     
Table 1, below, summarizes the economic characteristics that can affect fiscal policy 
effectiveness. 
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Table 1. Summary of fiscal multipliers' (FM) determinants 
Economic Features Relationship Authores 
STRUCTURAL  
Trade 
Openess 
Smaller FM 
╚ Opened 
economies 
 Barrel et al. (2012) 
 Ilzetzki et al. (2013) 
 Batini et al. (2014) 
Labor Market  Larger FM  
╚ More rigid labour 
markets  
 Cole and Ohanian 
(2004) 
 Batini et al. (2014) 
Automatic 
Stabilizers 
Smaller FM  
╚ Larger automatic 
stabilizers  
 Dolls et al. (2012) 
 Batini et al. (2014) 
Exchange 
Rate Regimes 
Larger FM 
╚ Predetermined 
exchange rates  
 Corsetti et al. (2012) 
 Born et al. (2013)  
 Ilzetzki et al. (2013) 
 Batini et al. (2014) 
Debt Level Smaller FM  
╚ High debt-levels   
 Kichner et al. (2010) 
 Huidrom et al. (2016) 
Level of 
Development 
Larger FM  
╚ Industrial 
countries 
 Ilzetzki et al. (2013) 
 Batini et al. (2014) 
CONJUNCTURAL  
Cycle Phases Larger FM  
╚ Recession  
 Michaillat (2011) 
 Auerbach and 
Gorodnichenko (2012) 
 Corsetti et al. (2012) 
 Batini et al. (2014) 
 Canzoneri et al. (2016) 
Monetary 
Policy 
Larger FM  
╚ Monetary 
accommodation  
 Christiano et al. (2011) 
 Coenen et al. (2012) 
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2.2. Economic Inequality 
2.2.1. Definition and measurement 
 
Although our focus is on income inequality, it is relevant to define economic inequality 
in a more general sense. Jenkins (1991, p. 4) defines economic inequality as “differences in access 
or control over economic resources”. This can apply to, e.g., consumption, wealth, skills or income. 
We will focus on income inequality as it closely relates to other forms of economic inequality, 
such as wealth or consumption inequality.  
In this sense it is important clarify that income represents a flow, measuring the quantity 
of good and services produced and distributed each year and it can be accessed by the sum 
of labour income and capital income (Piketty and Saez, 2014). Therefore, income inequality 
is related with mechanisms that “include the supply of and demand for different skills, the state of the 
educational system, and the various rules and institutions that affect the operation of the labour market and 
the determination of wages” (Piketty, 2014, p. 742).  
Atkinson (1970) explain the measure of inequality as a comparison of two frequency 
distributions for a given income, there are several ways to represent and measure income 
inequality. Accordingly to Jenkins (1991) the income distribution may be graphically 
represented by: “Histograms and Kernel Density Estimates”; “Pen’s Parade – the Quantile 
Function” or “Lorenz Curves”. The same author also presents several measures to 
summarize inequality: variance, percentile ratio measures, the Robin Hood index and the 
Gini index.  
In order to define the best measure, Jenkins (1991) mention four properties that must 
bind. First, the index must have the scale invariance property, that is it should be the same 
regardless the scale of measure. The second property is the “replication invariance”, by which 
a replication of the population and their incomes must not change the aggregate inequality. 
Additionally, a third property is the symmetry axiom – the index depends only on the income 
values used to construct it, i.e. it is not important who earns the income- underlying the 
importance of equalization. Last but not least, the principle of transfers according to which 
if there is an income transfer from an individual to another with lower income so the new 
distribution should be preferred. 
The Gini index is most-commonly used and takes values from 0 to 1, perfect equality to 
perfect inequality, respectively, and it is defined as “the ratio of the area enclosed by the Lorenz curve 
and the diagonal line of perfect equality to the total area below the diagonal” (Jenkins 1991, p. 15). In 
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accordance, the Lorenz Curve is the graph that represents the cumulative income shares 
against the cumulative population share (see, among others, Jenkins, 1991). Thus, the Gini 
index compares the cumulative shares of the population against the cumulative shares of 
income they receive, taking the value 1 when all income is held by a single person – perfect 
inequality. 
 
2.2.2. Income inequality and the economy 
 
There are in the literature some debate about the relationship between the economy and 
income inequality: on the one hand, what are the economic characteristics that affect income 
inequality and, on the other hand, how income inequality can impact on economic variables.  
The core of this discussion is the relationship between income inequality and economic 
growth, where it is possible to find authors who defend a positive correlation and the 
opposite relationship as well. García-Peñalosa and Turnovsky (2006) say that these dual 
criteria are expected since the variables are endogenous and consequently their co-
movements may depend on the changes (structural or political) caused by them.  
Neves and Silva (2014) present an analysis of the theoretical and empirical studies about 
this relationship. They find four transmission mechanisms associated with different theories 
which point to opposite conclusion as said before: i) credit market imperfection channel; ii) 
fiscal policy channel; iii) socio-political instability channel; and iv) saving channel 
The first identified channel is related with credit market imperfection and it is been 
explored since Galor and Zeira (1993). These authors developed an equilibrium model with 
overlapping generations and inter-generational altruism, where the individuals only differ in 
their inherited wealth, concluding that the more biased the distribution of wealth is to the 
poorer the worst the investment in human capital, the skilled work and the bequest leaved, 
meaning that inequality impacts negatively the growth. 
The second channel is the fiscal policy one. Neves and Silva (2014) note two perspectives 
for this channel. The first view, also explained by Perotti (1996), presupposes two links 
leading to the result of higher growth with lower inequality: the political mechanism – the 
decrease on distortionary taxation implies increase in growth due to the median voter 
behaviour - and the economic mechanism - negative impact of taxation and redistribution 
on investment and consequently on growth. In a more recent perspective it is established an 
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association between the fiscal policy channel and the capital market imperfections channel: 
Neves and Silva (2014) point to a negative relationship between inequality and redistribution 
whose impact on growth depends on the balance between credit constraints and incentive 
distortions. 
The third channel, also pointing to a negative long-term relationship between inequality 
and growth, is called by Neves and Silva (2014) Socio-political Instability Channel. According to 
the authors this channel acts through two links: (1) political instability caused by initial 
inequality in wealth or income and (2) the negative impact of the instability on investment 
and growth. 
Last but not least, on the theoretical side of the literature, appears the saving channel 
which is based on the hypothesis of a higher marginal propensity to savings by the richer, 
indicating a positive impact of inequality on growth due to higher aggregate savings and, 
consequently, higher investment and growth in response to higher inequality. 
From the empirical perspective, the results depend on methodologic issues. Neves and 
Silva (2014) conclude that in cross section studies, in less developed countries and using 
wealth distribution, the impact is negative and more pronounced. On the contrary, the results 
tend to be positive, although not significant, on panel data analysis with developed countries 
when income inequality is considered.  
On the opposite way of this relationship Roine et al. (2009) find a positive impact of 
economic growth and financial development on top-income shares. The authors justify the 
positive impact of economic growth by the simple fact that top incomes are more related to 
actual performance, since their income is tied to the actual development, for instance, 
through bonus programs or stock options, causing higher inequality. Similarly, the authors 
relate financial development with increases on total capitalization and consequently 
advantages to top income shares, however the impact on the overall distribution of income 
is more limited.  
On the other hand, trade openness seems to affect little top-income earners on average, 
and, if any, the impact is negative. Roine et al. (2009) study Anglo-Saxon countries and 
continental Europe countries having similar results on the impact of economic growth and 
financial development but in case of trade openness the effects are different which makes 
them think that the labour markets institutions may play a role on the differences observed.  
Still related with the degree of openness, Jaumotte et al. (2013) study the impact of 
increasing globalization on income inequality. They find evidence of two counterweighing 
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effects of globalization. Firstly, and in the same line of thought as Roine et al. (2009), they 
find a reduction on income inequality due to the increase of trade. Concerning to this effect 
the authors divide their analyses between developed and developing countries. In developing 
countries, they find that the improvement on agriculture sector and the shift from primary 
sector to industry and services, in countries where there is a higher percentage of population 
working on primary sector, leads to the decrease in inequality in response to an increase on 
trade. In case of developed countries this effect is not so clear, they find that an increase of 
imports from developing countries reduces inequality but in case imports come from 
advanced economies the effect is opposite, the authors argue that in the first case people will 
move from low-ending manufacturing jobs to the services sector which does not happen in the 
latter situation. On the other hand, and inversely, Jaumotte et al. (2013) state that foreign 
direct investment (FDI) can increase income inequality since financial globalization allows 
agents to invest and borrow more easily in production or in human capital benefiting capital 
owners’ future income and impairing the agents who are unable to invest. All in all, they 
conclude that the second effect from FDI exacerbate the effect of the degree of openness.  
Pikkety and Saez (2014) also argue that globalization, by leading to skill-biased technical 
changes and to the increase of information technology, can lead to higher income inequality. 
They affirm that there is a “race between education and technology” (p.842) associated with a rise in 
the supply of skills and a rise in the demand of skills, respectively. Defending that the impact 
on income inequality depends on the faster process to occur.  
Kumhof et al. (2015) explore the relationship between income inequality, leverage and 
crises. They introduce a theoretical model where a growing income share of high-income 
households leads to an increase of credit supply allowing higher consumption levels by poor 
and middle-income households. Thus, the loans keep growing and, consequently, the 
probability of crises. 
Auclert (2017) looks at the transmission mechanism of monetary policy to consume and 
argues that redistribution is a channel through which this transmission occurs. He finds an 
“earnings heterogeneity channel” explained by the fact that monetary expansions induce gains in 
earnings both from labour and profits, despite it is expected that this distribution would be 
unequal. Moreover by the “fisher channel”, the nominal creditors will loose and the nominal 
debtors will gain since there will be unexpected inflation. A third channel is called “interest 
rate channel” acting through the fall of real interest rates, the author claim that assets holders 
will not be beneficiate by it, instead he invites us to think about the maturity of their assets 
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compared to their liabilities. The mechanism explained by Auclert (2017) show that monetary 
policy certainly affects income inequality since the mechanism considered will have a 
redistributive impact, decreasing inequality.  
In a different point of view but also meaningful to this analysis, Auclert and Rognlie 
(2018) approach the impacts of income inequality on consumption and output. They find 
that transitory inequality shocks can decline consumption and output. However these effects 
are not significant. Looking at the long run they find stronger effects on output in case where 
inequality is the manifestation of higher individual income risk and volatility, and the interest 
rate response is constrained. In this last case, they point the long-run households asset 
demand as an important variable to explain the effect found, since the impact on 
consumption loses significance.  
Table 2, below, summarize relationships that can be established between some economic 
variables and income inequality. 
 
Table 2. Summary of relationship between income inequality and economic 
features 
Economic Features Relationship with Inequality Authors 
Economic Growth 
Effect of inequality on growth: 
positive (saving channel); negative 
(credit market imperfections, fiscal 
policy and socio-political instability 
channels) 
 Galor and Zeira (1993) 
 Perotti (1996) 
 Neves and Silva (2014) 
 
Higher Inequality through positive 
impact on top income   
 García-Peñalosa and 
Turnovsky (2006) 
 Roine et al. (2009) 
Financial Development  
Higher Inequality through positive 
impact on top-income shares  
 Roine et al. (2009) 
Trade Openess  Lower inequality (little impact) 
 Roine et al. (2009) 
 Jaumotte et al. (2013) 
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Table 2. (continuation) Summary of relationship between income inequality and 
economic features 
Economic Features Relationship with Inequality Authors 
Globalization 
Two counterweighing effects: 1) 
lower inequality (trade); 2) higher 
inequality (FDI))  
Jaumotte et al. (2013) 
Pikkety and Saez 
(2014) 
Leverage  
Higher inequality leads to higher 
leverage (crisis)  
Kumhof et al. (2015)   
Monetary Policy 
Redistributive impact, consequently 
lower inequality  
Auclert (2017) 
 
2.3. Mechanisms through which inequality affects fiscal policy 
effectiveness  
 
Recently, a new branch in the literature started inspecting the role of another structural 
factor affecting fiscal policy effectiveness: unequal distribution of wealth and income. In 
what follows we provide a, yet inexistent, comprehensive literature review on the state of the 
art covering this research topic. We propose to carefully detail the mechanisms linking broad 
economic inequality dimensions (e.g., consumption, wealth and income) to the fiscal policy 
effectiveness, measured by the size of fiscal multipliers. 
In regard to the direct relationship between inequality and fiscal multipliers, Brinca et al. 
(2016) find a positive correlation between wealth inequality and fiscal multipliers due to the 
impact of the fraction of credit-constrained individuals and of the average wealth level. 
According to the authors, higher government consumption, financed through lump-sum 
taxes, will lead to an increase in labour supply, particularly strong among credit-constrained, 
poorer, workers. In addition, marginal propensity to consume is also larger among credit-
constrained agents. Hence a wealthy economy, with a smaller proportion of credit-
constrained agents, will have lower fiscal policy effectiveness. Moreover, under imperfect 
capital markets, average interest rates are lower for wealthier economies and that turns 
smaller the impacts of government spending on the individuals’ budget constraint, reducing 
the fiscal multiplier.  
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More recently, still relying on the mechanism of how credit-constrained agents respond 
to fiscal consolidation plans, Brinca et al. (2017) introduce a new mechanism in a model 
documenting a strong positive relationship between income inequality and the recessive 
impacts of fiscal consolidation plans, thus between income inequality and the size of fiscal 
multipliers. By reducing government debt, capital-to-labour increases and put upward 
pressures on wages. This produces an income effect that has a negative impact on labour 
supply and to which credit-constrained households react by less than non-constrained ones. 
When inequality is driven by higher idiosyncratic productivity risk, precautionary savings are 
higher and thus the fraction of credit-constrained agents is lower. This means that income 
effects from debt consolidation on decreasing labour supply are larger, and thus inducing a 
larger fall in output (larger multiplier). This mechanism though, assumes a negative 
correlation between inequality and the fraction of credit-constrained consumers, since the 
authors state that inequality is driving by idiosyncratic risk and consequently a lower fraction 
of constrained agents due to higher precautionary savings. 
Working on a close subject, Dosi et al. (2013) conclude that more unequal economies 
face worst business cycle fluctuations, higher unemployment rates and greater probability of 
crises, and the more income distribution is biased towards profits (higher inequality) the 
greater the effects of fiscal policy (higher multiplier). They use mark-up rates to define the 
income distribution, and higher mark-up rates mean a distribution more biased to profits, 
reminding that these results where reach in a scenario of a positive level of fiscal 
redistributive policy. The authors point out the importance of redistributive policy to 
dampen the business cycle in presence of income distribution skewed toward profits. 
Anderson et al. (2016) also bring into discussion the importance of heterogenous agents 
in the study of the effects of unexpected changes in fiscal policy. They conclude that the 
wealthiest and working-age individuals react more negatively to government spending policy 
shocks, decreasing their consumption due to be less credit-constrained. This is consistent 
with Real Business Cycle models that predict a decrease in consumption in response to the 
increase in government consumption due to expectations of higher taxes in the future. 
Krueger et al. (2016) also prove that wealth inequality can amplify the effects of aggregate 
shocks, nevertheless it is important, as mentioned above, the presence of a large fraction of 
“wealth-poor households”. They argue that in context of a recession, those agents react more 
by reducing consumption implying a lower collapse in investment and consequently a faster 
recovery. 
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 Antunes and Ercolani (2016), in turn, study the role of households borrowing 
constraints. The authors say that fiscal policies that entail government debt expansion are 
expected to make the borrowing constraints tighter because of higher interest rates. It is 
predicted a cut in consumption because higher interest rates force constrained agents to 
deleverage and unconstrained agents to make precautionary savings. However, the authors 
find different reactions of constrained and unconstrained agents in response to such a fiscal 
policy shock, conjecturing that the aggregate effect of such a shock depends on wealth 
distribution. For instance, in response to an increase in government transfers consistently 
distributed, the authors claim that the constrained agents react by increasing consumption, 
while the unconstrained ones choose to smooth consumption and to buy assets or to 
decrease their indebtedness in order to pay higher future taxes. Thus if the population is 
more biased to constrained agents, than the response to the shock will be more effective in 
terms of aggregate consumption. 
Other authors also describe the mechanism working through the marginal propensity to 
consume (MPC) which depends on the level of household’s wealth. For instance, Carroll et 
al. (2017) find evidence, considering heterogeneity in impatience among different households 
and a realist microeconomic income process which captures the dispersion in the distribution 
of wealth, of a higher MPC in response to a one-time income shock for “low-wealth” 
households. They conclude, as well, that the average marginal propensity to consume is larger 
when the fraction of households with less cash is also larger. In the same line of thought, 
Kaplan et al. (2014) conclude that “wealthy hand-to-mouth consumers” (households that 
hold little or no liquid wealth despite owing illiquid assets) exhibit a higher MPC out of 
transitory income shocks. They explain the behaviour of these households based on Kaplan 
and Violante (2014) in which they refer that “wealthy hand-to-mouth consumers” prefer 
bearing the welfare lost instead of smoothing the shock because the latter option imply either 
paying transaction costs over their illiquid assets or holding large balances of cash and 
consequently high return on illiquid assets or, even, getting credit at expensive interest rates. 
So the more biased population distribution is towards “low-wealth” and “wealthy hand-to-
mouth” consumers, the larger the MPC (the marginal propensity to save is smaller) and, thus, 
the larger the expected aggregate impacts of fiscal policy. 
Pointing in a different directiont Palagi et al. (2017) build a model incorporating 
permanent inequality shocks and consequently a higher fraction of credit constrained agents 
plus lower aggregate consumption which leads to larger and more persistent falls on 
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aggregate output. From this model they test the effectiveness of some fiscal instruments- 
direct government spending or subsidies provided to low-income households- the general 
conclusion is that fiscal policy dampens the effects of those shocks presenting multipliers 
higher than one. Also, subsidies are more efficient than government spending, since the first 
instrument benefits low income households which present higher marginal propensity to 
consume.  However, they realise that inequality shock with larger magnitude leads to decrease 
of fiscal multipliers due to a larger redistributive effect in favour of richer agents (savers), 
leading to the augment of leakage in aggregate expenditure in the presence of credit rationing. 
Looking at the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) 2009, Drautzburg 
and Uhlig (2015) include credit constrained agents in their model in order to quantify the 
fiscal multipliers in response to that fiscal stimulus. According to the results, this type of 
agents is important to be considered in terms of fiscal policies effectiveness.  They argue that 
there are two reasons why the fraction of credit-constrained households is crucial: the first 
is the violation of Ricardian equivalence3 by this portion of population (amplifying the 
stimulus effect); and the second is the aggregate effects of transfers’ distribution to these 
credit-constrained households. They find that both a rise of constrained agents and a larger 
share of transfers to those consumers impact the size of fiscal multiplier by increasing it. 
Assuming that both represent lower inequality, then there is a negative correlation between 
inequality and the fiscal multiplier.  
Samanta and Cerf (2009) using a set of transitional and developing countries and applying 
different types of econometric estimations (panel data approach and cross section approach) 
reach consistent results: less effectiveness of fiscal policy when economies are more unequal. 
An important note is that despite the focus on wealth inequality by the majority of the 
authors, income and wealth inequality can be related, moreover income also includes wealth 
income and reflects, partially, wealth inequality. Notwithstanding the greater concentration 
on wealth inequality, both are positively correlated (Diaz-Gimenez et al., 1997). Hence, it is 
expectable that differences on income inequality will have different impacts on fiscal policy 
effectiveness due to heterogeneous behaviour from individuals.  
Table 3, below, summarize relationships that can be established between some income 
inequality and fiscal policy and the implicit mechanisms. 
                                                          
3 Based on Bernheim (1987) the Ricardian Equivalence assumes that individuals’ lifetime budgets do not depend 
on the timing of taxes implementation. Therefore, consumption decisions should not be affected by the 
increase of government consumption debt-financed.  
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Table 3. Summary of relationship between income inequality and fiscal policy 
Income and Fiscal Policy Mechanism Authors 
Positive correlation 
 
• Increase labour supply, 
lager between credit 
constrained; 
• Higher MPC of credit 
constrained; 
• Lower interest rates 
(imperfect capital 
markets) in wealthier 
economies. 
Brinca et al. (2016) 
(Shock in government 
consumption) 
• K/L increase → pressure 
on the wages → decrease 
labour supply; 
• Precautionary savings → 
less credit constrained → 
higher response to first 
effect. 
Brinca et al. (2017) 
(Fiscal consolidation) 
• More unequal:  
Worst business cycle 
fluctuations;   
Higher unemployment; 
Higher probability of 
crises. 
Dosi et al. (2013) 
• Less constrained → 
expectation of future taxes 
→ decrease consumption 
Anderson et al. (2016) 
(Spending policy) 
• “wealth-poor” agents → 
react more in terms of 
consumption 
Krueger et al. (2016) 
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Table 3. (Continuation) Summary of relationship between income inequality and 
fiscal policy 
Income and Fiscal Policy Mechanism Authors 
Positive correlation 
• Constrained agents 
increase consumption; 
• Unconstrained agents buy 
assets and decrease 
indebtedness 
Antunes and Ercolani 
(2016) 
(transfers equally 
distributed) 
Credit constrained agents (higher inequality) → higher 
MPC (higher response to income shock) 
Kaplan et al. (2014) 
Kaplan and Violante (2014) 
Carroll et al. (2017) 
Negative Relationship 
•  Inequality shocks with 
high magnitude → larger 
redistributive effect to 
richer – savers. 
Palagi et al. (2017) 
•  Non-Ricardian behaviour 
of credit constrained; 
•  Different responses to 
transfers.  
Drautzburg and Uhlig 
(2015) 
•  Based only on 
econometric estimation 
Samanta and Cerf (2009) 
 
Additionally, McKay and Reis (2016) provide some indirect insights on the link between 
inequality and fiscal policy effectiveness, namely on the role of automatic stabilizers to 
stabilize the business cycle. They state that the impact of lowering taxes on personal income, 
or reducing the progressivity of them, does not have a significant impact on attenuating the 
volatility of the business cycle. However, higher transfers targeted to the unemployed and 
the poorer are quite effective at lowering the volatility of aggregate output. In opposite to 
the mechanisms presented throughout former revised papers, McKay and Reis (2016) results 
show that some fiscal instruments used to reduce inequality are more effective for 
macroeconomic stabilization purposes. 
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As well Kaplanoglou et al. (2015) argue that “fiscal fair adjustments”, meaning fiscal 
policy that support the weaker parts of society, may be more efficient. They find a statistically 
significant positive impact in a sustained deficit reduction when the social transfers are 
targeted with a goal of poverty alleviation. Thus, if the so called “fiscal fair adjustments” are 
more effective we may deduce that the lower the income inequality (resulting from such 
policies) the better the policy effectiveness. 
In addition to the mechanisms described in this section, which show a more direct 
relationship between fiscal policy effects and inequality, we conjecture that if income 
inequality is explained by some of the structural features of the economy (such as the size of 
the government, financial development, trade openness, economic growth, globalization and 
leverage) or can impact on some of them, the widely-studied impacts of these features on 
the fiscal multiplier can also be, at least partially, explained by the impact on inequality. 
Therefore it is central to keep in mind how different economic environments impact on 
income inequality, already exposed in the previous section. It becomes clear that the fiscal 
policy effectiveness may crucially depend on the conditions of the economy regarding 
inequality. Moreover, it seems accurate to assume that this relation may even help explaining 
how some structural features of the economy, already widely studied in the literature (e.g., 
development level, debt levels, trade openness), shape fiscal multipliers.  
Bearing in mind the relationships showed before, we speculate that since both the size 
of fiscal multipliers and income inequality are influenced by business cycle phases, the latter 
may operate on the policy effectiveness through impacts on inequality. Furthermore, the 
probability of a crisis occurrence is larger when inequality is high, and this may help explain 
why during recessions, multipliers tend to be larger. Also, the economic growth and financial 
developments may have a positive impact on the multiplier because they foster inequality; in 
turn, one of the mechanisms that may explain lower fiscal multipliers in open economies is 
the impact of trade openness on, eventually, lowering income inequality. Still it can be noticed 
by the information provided earlier that monetary policy may have redistributive effects and 
may have impact on fiscal policy effectiveness. In the following we display a figure summing 
up these relationships: 
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Figure 1. Economic characteristics affecting income inequality and fiscal policy 
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3. Methodology  
 
In order to test the impact of income inequality on the effectiveness of fiscal policy, we 
propose an empirical approach divided in two parts. 
Using a sample of European Union (EU) countries, we first apply a vector autoregressive 
model (VAR) to estimate fiscal multipliers for spending and revenue in each country. Based 
on the data used to compute the multipliers we divide the sample between countries above 
and below average Gini index, as the goal is to study how most equal/unequal countries 
perform in terms of output responses to fiscal shocks. Second, on a cross-section basis, we 
regress Gini indexes on fiscal multipliers - for both public spending and revenue - using 
ordinary least squares (OLS) method. To complement this analysis, we estimate, also by OLS, 
the effect of income inequality in cases where other economic features, largely recognized as 
determinants of fiscal policy effectiveness, are included as independent variables. 
The methodology followed in the first part of our empirical work is of standard use in 
the estimation of fiscal multipliers and in analysing determinants of fiscal policy effectiveness 
(see, e.g., Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2012 and Ilzetzki et al., 2013). As for the 
methodology used in the second, we will follow the work of Brinca et al. (2016), although we 
focus only on developed countries, namely EU members, and extend the empirical model to 
include, as controls, additional variables that are, according to literature, meaningful to 
explain the size of fiscal multipliers.   
  
3.1. Methodology – Overview and model selection 
 
The use of vector autoregressive models for the computation of fiscal multipliers has 
gained importance among economists over the years. In fact, inspired by the use of structural 
VAR models to assess the effects of monetary policy on output some authors decided to 
apply it to fiscal policy.  Blanchard and Perotti (2002) consider that this kind of models are 
even more suitable to assess fiscal policy effectiveness, since there are clearly pure exogenous 
fiscal shocks and the decision and implementation lags allow that, at high frequencies, there 
is no discretionary response of fiscal policy to unexpected movements in activity. This 
enables a better identification of fiscal shocks and of the ordering of endogenous variables 
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than that we can achieve for policy feedback instruments that react at higher frequency, as is 
the caser of central bank’s official rates. 
The reduced VAR model can be described as: 
𝒀𝒕 = ∑ 𝑪𝒌𝒀 𝒕−𝒌 + 𝒆 𝒕 
𝑲
𝒌=𝟏
⋯ ⋯ (𝟏) 
where 𝑌𝑡 represents the n-dimension vector of endogenous variables. 𝐶𝑘 is a n times n 
matrix of estimated coefficients. The index 𝑘 represents the number of lags used in the 
model. As in any econometric estimation, the et is the reduced form of the estimation 
residuals and the t subscript refers to time. According to Perotti (2004), the reduced form of 
the residuals can be assumed as combination of automatic stabilizers, systematic 
discretionary response and random discretionary shocks to fiscal policies. The structural 
fiscal shock is meant to capture and reflects the last effect.    
The structural VAR model has the following form: 
𝑨𝟎𝒀𝒕 = ∑ 𝑨𝒌𝒀 𝒕−𝒌 + 𝑩𝒗 𝒕  ⋯ ⋯ (𝟐)
𝑲
𝒌=𝟏
 
where 𝐴0 is the matrix of the contemporaneous effects among variables in 𝑌𝑡. 
Furthermore, the relation between the reduced form (𝑒𝑡) and the structural form (𝑣𝑡) of the 
residuals is given by matrix 𝐵, in the following way:  
𝒗𝒕 = 𝑩
−𝟏𝑨𝟎𝒆𝒕  ⋯ ⋯ (𝟑) 
The impact of fiscal policy can be measured by the behavior of variables included in 𝑌𝑡, 
through impulse response functions. Impulse responses summarize the dynamics of all 
endogenous variables included in the system responding to a one-unit increase in the value 
of a structural residual, with all the other residuals fixed.  
After defining the structural form of the VAR, one of the main issues largely discussed 
by the authors who use this method is the identification of fiscal policy shocks. According 
to Hebous (2011) there are four approaches: the recursive formulation (Cholesky 
decomposition); the structural identification; the sign restriction approach and, finally, the 
narrative (dummy variable) approach. The first one relies on the fact that the first variable 
considered in the VAR model is the less endogenous, responding contemporaneously only 
to its own exogenous shock; the second variable responds, contemporaneously, to the shock 
in the first variable and also to its own shocks and so on. According to the second approach, 
the elasticities of spending and taxes to output are exogenously imposed to the VAR (see, 
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e.g., Blanchard and Perotti,2002). The third approach imposes a sign to the impulse response 
of the fiscal variables (see, e.g., Mountford and Uhlig, 2009). And the last one uses dummy 
variables to capture pure discretionary shocks’ periods identified from the analysis, e.g., of 
reports on the meetings of fiscal committees - mostly used on studies applied to U.S. 
economy (see, e.g., Ramey and Shapiro, 1998).     
We choose to rely on the Cholesky ordering already used in previous works as in Fatás 
and Mihov (2001) and Corsetti and Müller (2006), among others. In this case the ordering of 
the variables also indicates the tentative causal relationship between the variables. Therefore, 
it is important to understand the theory behind the order chosen. It is common to assume 
that government spending is predetermined and does not depend on current macroeconomic 
shocks or tax changes (e.g., Blanchard and Perrotti, 2002 and Fatás and Mihov, 2001). Fatás 
and Mihov (2001) argue that tax changes are pre-announced and consequently captured by 
expectation variables. Additionally, Blanchard and Perotti (2002) note that government 
expenditure and government revenue must be both included when studying the effects of 
fiscal policy since they are, presumably, not independent. Thus, in our VAR model we 
assume the following, rather standard in literature, order:  
𝑮𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒆𝒙𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒆𝒔 → 𝑮𝒓𝒐𝒔𝒔 𝑫𝒐𝒎𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒄 𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒕
→ 𝑮𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒓𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒏𝒖𝒆  
This means that on equation (2), matrix 𝐴0 and the matrix 𝐵 can be replaced, 
correspondingly, by: 
[
𝟏 𝟎 𝟎
𝒂𝟐𝟏 𝟏 𝟎
𝒂𝟑𝟏 𝒂𝟑𝟐 𝟏
] [
𝒆𝒆𝒙𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒆
𝒆𝒐𝒖𝒕𝒑𝒖𝒕
𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒏𝒖𝒆
] = [
𝟏 𝟎 𝟎
𝟎 𝟏 𝟎
𝟎 𝟎 𝟏
] [
𝒗𝒆𝒙𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒆
𝒗𝒐𝒖𝒕𝒑𝒖𝒕
𝒗𝒓𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒏𝒖𝒆
] ⋯ ⋯(5) 
 
Another important point to discuss when applying a VAR is the lag structure. To decide 
on the optimal number of lags to include, we can rely on some information criteria as Akaike 
or Schwartz criterion (Hebous, 2011). The best criteria to be used depend on the sample’s 
number of observations. For our small sample, with less than 100 observations per country, 
we base our choice on Akaike Criteria, determining the use of four lags. This is consistent 
with Ilzetzki et al. (2013) - who also use quarterly data and a lag structure of  𝑘 = 4.  
Having fiscal multipliers estimated, we first attempt to split the sample between two 
groups: countries with higher than sample-average inequality and economies below sample-
average. From this point we check for differences in the average responses to fiscal shocks 
across the two groups.  
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In the second part of our empirical analysis, we regress the values of fiscal multipliers 
previously computed for each country on an average inequality measure, as in Brinca et al. 
(2016), using only cross-sectional data for each country. The cross-section baseline model is 
described by:  
𝑭𝑴𝒏 = 𝜶 + 𝜷𝟏𝑮𝒊𝒏𝒊𝒏 + 𝜺𝒏  ⋯ ⋯ (𝟕) 
In this model we regress the estimated fiscal multiplier (FM) for country n on the Gini 
coefficient in country n. Given that 𝛽1 describes the change in 𝐹𝑀𝑛  in response to a unit 
change in 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛, this estimation allows us to establish a relationship between the two 
variables. 
Additionally, we use other variables, widely accepted as determinants of fiscal policy 
effectiveness, to estimate the effect of Gini index controlling for those factors.  
For the both fiscal multipliers on the expenditure side and revenue side, 𝐹𝑀, we estimate: 
𝑭𝑴𝒏 = 𝜶 + 𝜷𝟏𝑮𝒊𝒏𝒊𝒏 + 𝜷𝟐𝑻𝒓𝒂𝒅𝒆 𝑶𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒏 +  𝜷𝟑𝑫𝒆𝒃𝒕 𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒍𝒏
+ 𝜷𝟒𝑫𝒆𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒅𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒍𝒐𝒑𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒏 +  𝜺𝒏  ⋯ (𝟖) 
 
In this regression, we add, to the original one in Brinca et al. (2016), the variables 
representing trade openness and debt level for country n (we maintain the effect for degree 
of development which also appears in Brinca et al. (2016) represented by output per capita). 
The estimation of the coefficient 𝛽2, 𝛽3 and 𝛽4 represent the response of fiscal multiplier to 
these economic variables, respectively, and the estimate for 𝛽1 has the same interpretation as 
before. The variables choice was based on the fact that these characteristics not only impact 
fiscal multipliers but also income inequality as discussed on previous section 2.3.   
All estimations were performed using EViews9 software.  
 
3.2. Methodology – Data and variables  
 
We collect statistics for 27 EU’s countries - Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, 
Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom. Despite the availability of data for Luxembourg (the 28th 
country from EU) we exclude this country from our analysis because most of the workforce 
is foreign and thus income dispersion as given by the Gini index may be rather distortive. 
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The fifteen years period from 2002 to 2017 was chosen to be used throughout the whole 
study. We intend to have the most homogenous period for the 27 countries and across all 
the variables. By using this homogenised period we also expect to capture more standardised 
shocks.  
Variables used in the estimation of fiscal multipliers (government expenditures; 
government revenue; GDP) are taken in quarterly frequency from the Eurostat database and 
are available for the entire period of analysis for all the 27 countries. We choose such date 
frequency to enhance the performance of the VAR model in the presence of larger samples. 
Government consumption (VAREXP), gross domestic product (VARGDP) and 
government revenue (VARREV) used in the VAR should be both stationary and seasonally 
adjusted. In order to fulfil such requirements, we use variables in logarithms of the fourth 
difference, i.e., we use quarterly, seasonally-adjusted, growth rates. All the variables are at 
2010 constant prices – converted through the application of GDP deflator - to remove the 
price’s effect. All nominal variables were first homogenised to euros.    
Given that for the cross-section analysis we only need period-average values for the 
variables, we use annual statistics for the Gini coefficient, trade openness, debt level and 
development level, collected from the AMECO and the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) databases. We choose equivalised Gini index (GINI_INDEX) to 
measure inequality, since it matches the properties that Jenkins (1991) points as essential for 
a good quantification of income dispersion. In what regards variables related to country-
specific economic characteristics, we use trade openness (TRADE_OPENESS) as 
conventionally computed - exports plus imports divided by two times gross domestic 
product. The debt-to-output ratio is the variable used for the debt level (DEBT_LEVEL). 
And, finally, to account for the country’s degree of development 
(DEGREE_DEVELOPMENT) we use the human development index (HDI) or, 
alternatively, the GDP per capita.  
 
  
28 
 
 
4. Analysis of results – Income inequality and fiscal policy 
effectiveness in Europe 
 
The results obtained on the empirical estimation are now presented and analysed. 
Throughout this section we try to establish a link between our empirical results and those 
expected from the relevant literature explored throughout previous sections, always trying to 
highlight the likely theoretical mechanism behind such links. In section 4.1 we compute and 
analyse fiscal multipliers, providing detailed analysis for countries exhibiting a Gini index 
above and below average. In section 4.2, we quantitatively assess and analyse whether income 
inequality has impacts on the size of fiscal multipliers. 
 
4.1. Fiscal multipliers in the EU 
 
We apply a VAR model to each one of the 27 countries, using the previous mentioned 
Cholesky ordering and a structure of four lags. We now exhibit the results from the 
estimations performed on Eviews9. 
Table 1 illustrates the VAR outcome for France. We first conclude, for a significance 
level of 5% that the estimation seems to be statistically significant overall, since the observed 
F-statistic is greater than the F-critical value4. Adjusted R2 also denote a fairly good 
adjustment, particularly in the case of the GDP equation. 
 
Table 4. VAR estimation, FR 2004Q1 - 2017Q4 
Vector Autoregression Estimates 
Sample (adjusted): 2004Q1 2017Q4 
Included observations: 56 after adjustments 
 VAREXP VARGDP VARREV 
VAREXP(-1) 0.461833 -0.086040 -0.421636 
VAREXP(-2) 0.102679 0.161974 0.723275 
VAREXP(-3) -0.016380 -0.076862 -0.224451 
                                                          
4 Obtained by the application of the following command on Eviews9: @qfdist(0.95,3,56). 
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VAREXP(-4) 0.050621 0.028767 -0.150298 
VARGDP(-1) 0.240125 1.181512 1.556204 
VARGDP(-2) -0.615501 -0.220676 -1.597786 
VARGDP(-3) 0.351375 0.061025 0.514946 
VARGDP(-4) 0.207653 -0.269543 -0.038833 
VARREV(-1) -0.122334 0.010315 0.213464 
VARREV(-2) -0.068753 -0.075222 0.225608 
VARREV(-3) 0.062918 -0.094536 -0.068388 
VARREV(-4) -0.108002 0.134146 0.009653 
C 0.008409 0.002791 0.007018 
R-squared 0.548834 0.836768 0.547516 
Adj. R-squared 0.422927 0.791215 0.421242 
Sum sq. resids 0.003437 0.002095 0.013601 
S.E. equation 0.008941 0.006980 0.017785 
F-statistic 4.359047 18.36908 4.335918 
Log likelihood 192.0950 205.9622 153.5821 
Akaike AIC -6.396251 -6.891508 -5.020789 
Schwarz SC -5.926080 -6.421337 -4.550618 
Mean dependent 0.015705 0.011422 0.017451 
S.D. dependent 0.011770 0.015275 0.023378 
 Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  7.32E-13  
 Determinant resid covariance  3.31E-13  
 Log likelihood  566.2173  
 Akaike information criterion -18.82919  
 Schwarz criterion -17.41868  
 
Using similar VAR estimate for all countries, we then compute impulse response 
functions of GDP to fiscal shocks. Figure 2 and figure 3 illustrate the impulse responses and 
the accumulated impulse responses of GDP to spending for Poland and of GDP to revenue 
for Portugal, respectively, for a horizon of 8 quarters ahead. Even though the impulse 
responses do not show fiscal multipliers, they provide evidence of their statistical significance 
and sign. As we will see below, impulse responses provide the required input to compute 
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impact multipliers, while accumulated impulse responses are need for computing long-term 
multipliers.  
 
Figure 2. Impulse response of GDP to spending (left-hand panel) and accumulated 
impulse response (right-hand panel), Poland5 
-.010
-.005
.000
.005
.010
.015
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Response of VARGDP to VAREXP
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
 
 
Figure 3. Impulse response of GDP to spending (left-hand panel) and accumulated 
impulse response (right-hand panel), Poland6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Impact impulse responses functions plotted in left side of figures above show period by 
period impact on GDP growth from one standard deviation shock in the growth rate of 
government expenditures (Figure 2) and from one standard deviation shock in taxes (Figure 
3). The shock is defined as a one-shot shock in quarter 1. As both responses and confidence 
lines lie mostly off the zero line, we conclude for the overall significance of the responses. It 
derives from the assumptions underlying our option for Cholesky ordering, that the first 
period impact response of GDP to taxes is zero, while, and as expected according to the 
literature, an increase in government spending will increase GDP on impact and an increase 
on taxes will decrease GDP. 
                                                          
5 Selected results for illustrative purposes. 
6 Selected results for illustrative purposes. 
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The right side of Figures 2 and 3, in turn, shows the cumulative effects (sum of the impact 
effects) on GDP growth, resulting from a one-shot shock of one standard deviation in 
quarter 1 in the growth of government spending and taxes.  
Besides the qualitative perception on the sign of the multipliers, the impulse response 
functions are used to compute estimated fiscal multipliers. For the impact, or short-run, 
multiplier we base our analysis on the impact impulse responses (as in left side of the 
displayed figures) while for the long-run, cumulative, fiscal multipliers we use the 
accumulated responses (as in right side of the figures above). To compute fiscal multipliers 
we need two components: i) the elasticity of GDP to a fiscal instrument – the ratio between 
the reaction of GDP to a fiscal shock and the reaction of fiscal policy to itself from the 
computed directly from impulse responses; ii) the average weight of government spending 
(or revenue) GDP (Marvão Pereira e Roca-Sagalés, 2011). Fiscal multiplier is defined by how 
many euros GDP increases due to a shock of one euro in government spending (or revenue), 
i.e., i) over ii). This procedure is replicated to the 27 countries and for shocks in both 
government revenue and expenditures. Results for the computed multipliers are shown in 
Tables 4 and 5.  
 
Table 5. Fiscal multipliers of government expenditures, impact (1Q) and 
cumulative (1Y) or (2Y) 7 
Country 1Q 1Y 2Y 
Belgium -0,0247 -0,1095 -0,2049 
Bulgaria 0,0068 0,0260 0,0136 
Czech Republic -0,0024 -0,0627 -0,1067 
Denmark -0,0518 -0,1791 -0,2213 
Germany  -0,0348 -0,1606 -0,2338 
Estonia -0,0583* -0,3963* -0,7466 
Ireland -0,0082 -0,0084 -0,0072 
Greece 0,0353* 0,1171 0,1595 
Spain -0,0141* -0,0513 -0,1794 
France 0,0438 0,1097 0,2069 
Croatia -0,0502 -0,1576 -0,5340 
                                                          
7 The values marked with (*) represent estimates that are statistically significant. The same is applied to the 
following two tables. 
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Table 5. (Continuation) Fiscal multipliers of government expenditures, impact (1Q) 
and cumulative (1Y) or (2Y) 
Country 1Q 1Y 2Y 
Italy 0,0272 0,3638 0,3605 
Cyprus 0,0091 0,0307 0,0605 
Latvia 0,0175 -0,0020 0,0465 
Lithuania -0,0010 -0,0305 -0,0421 
Hungary 0,0134 0,0960 0,2010 
Malta 0,0259 -0,0034 -0,0563 
Netherlands 0,0245* 0,0862 0,0171 
Austria -0,0287* -0,1622 -0,1227 
Poland 0,0706* 0,2214* 0,3891* 
Portugal -0,0046 -0,0132 -0,0342 
Romania 0,0164 0,0164 0,0164 
Slovenia 0,0114 0,0388 0,0514 
Slovakia 0,0091 0,0837 0,1777 
Finland 0,2316* 0,4677 0,0390 
Sweden 0,1219* 0,3468 0,2124 
United Kingdom -0,0143 -0,2347* -0,4695* 
 
Table 6. Fiscal multipliers of government revenues, impact (2Q) and cumulative 
(1Y) or (2Y) 
Country  2Q 1Y 2Y 
Belgium -0,222 -0,135 -0,411 
Bulgaria 0,001 -0,008 -0,057 
Czech Republic -0,002 -0,042 -0,098 
Denmark 0,061 0,311* 0,548* 
Germany  0,125 0,529 0,901 
Estonia 0,042* 0,199 0,277 
Ireland 0,025 0,100 0,400 
Greece 0,008 0,007 0,099 
Spain 0,021* 0,137* 0,321* 
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Table 6. (Continuation) Fiscal multipliers of government revenues, impact (2Q) 
and cumulative (1Y) or (2Y) 
Country  2Q 1Y 2Y 
France 0,005 -0,110 -0,225 
Croatia 0,074* 0,220* 0,199* 
Italy -0,004 0,037 -0,072 
Cyprus 0,002 0,018 0,035 
Latvia 0,061* 0,310* 0,869* 
Lithuania 0,014 0,031 0,054 
Hungary -0,033 -0,066 -0,004 
Malta 0,002 0,001 0,015 
Netherlands -0,024 -0,116 -0,204 
Austria -0,145* -0,453* -0,816* 
Poland 0,037* 0,122* 0,225* 
Portugal -0,024* -0,103* -0,324* 
Romania 0,028 0,109 0,015 
Slovenia -0,052 -0,346* -0,742* 
Slovakia 0,0001 -0,117 -0,187 
Finland 0,089 0,172 -0,698 
Sweden 0,210* 0,718* 1,122* 
United Kingdom 0,013 0,062 0,196 
 
Some of the results for the fiscal multipliers both for the response to a shock in 
expenditures and revenues present an opposite sign to what was expected and are statistically 
significant. Among the relevant literature reviewed above, some evidence was found 
indicating non-Keynesian effects from fiscal policy shocks, depending on the size and 
persistence of the shock (see, e.g., Giavazzi and Pagano, 1995). Despite having these 
unexpected results, we will use the computed FM in the second stage of our empirical 
approach.  
But before, and taking the same time series data, we split the sample into countries 
exhibiting an average Gini coefficient above and below sample-average. Then, using a panel 
for the two groups of countries, we perform VAR estimation for each group separately. 
Figure 4 and 5 depict the accumulated response functions, respectively to a shock in 
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government spending and revenue. Left-hand panels refer to countries with higher than 
average Gini coefficient while right-hand panels refer to EU countries that exhibit low 
inequality. 
 
Figure 4. Accumulated response of GDP to a shock in government expenditures, 
high (left-hand panel) vs low (left-hand panel) income inequality in the EU 
 
 
Figure 5. Accumulated response of GDP to a shock in government revenues, high 
(left-hand panel) vs low (left-hand panel) income inequality in the EU 
 
 
From the inspection of the above impulse responses, it seems that EU countries with 
lower inequality exhibit higher government expenditure multipliers when compared to 
countries with higher inequality (for which impulse response functions are not statistically 
significant). This indicates higher response to demand-side fiscal policy in countries with 
lower inequality. 
As for the results in regarding shocks to government revenues (taxes), a tax increase is 
more likely to result in an increase in GDP where inequality is higher, while it produces no 
effects on output when inequality is low. In this case, the results point to more efficiency of 
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this kind of fiscal policy in more unequal countries (higher Gini coefficient), although with 
evidence for non-Keynesian effects. 
The results regarding government expenditures multipliers are distinct from that 
reported on Brinca et al. (2016) since in their works was shown evidence of higher multipliers 
in response to a shock in government consumption associated with countries with higher 
inequality. Unlike the consistence with Brinca et al. (2017) who find evidence of a positive 
correlation when accounting for a fiscal consolidation between fiscal multipliers and income 
inequality, accordingly to what we find out. 
These results point to two different directions regarding the impact of income inequality 
on fiscal policy effectiveness depending on the “side” of the shock. We will now proceed 
with a complementary analysis to verify the robustness of this result.   
 
4.2. Inequality and the size of multipliers in the EU 
 
The second part of our empirical analysis makes use of a cross-section model, 
considering period-average values of the discussed variables across the 27 countries. We here 
show the Eviews9 outputs with selected results for OLS estimations of the impacts of 
inequality level on the size of fiscal multipliers.  
In regards to government spending, the baseline model includes the Gini coefficient as 
the single regressor (see appendix A.1) of the 1-year fiscal multiplier8. Apparently, Gini 
coefficient is not statistically significant to explain government spending multiplier as the 
corresponding coefficient shows a p-value of 0.3345. 
In turn, Table 7 shows results for the complete model, where we also control for the 
degree of openness, the debt level and the degree of development (measured by IDH). The 
coefficient of Gini index is significant at a confidence level of 90%, however the other three 
control variables has, apparently, no impact on the size of the government spending in the 
EU.  
The not significant result found for the coefficient of trade openness may be related with 
large differences in the sample. Usually authors divide the sample between countries opened 
to trade or closed finding evidence of a relationship between each group and fiscal 
multipliers. As Ilzetzki et al. (2013) who claim high multipliers for close countries and 
                                                          
8 We use the values for fiscal multipliers as shown in the above tables. 
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negative multipliers for opened. Thus, a very heterogenous sample may it is not possible to 
establish a pattern.  
On the other hand the differences on the multipliers found together with the 
homogenous sample used in terms of the degree of development may be turning the results 
of coefficients regarding the degree of development. The values’ gap between the most 
developed and the less developed country in terms of IDH is only 0.143 - the maximum 
0.909 (Denmark) and the minimum 0.766 (Bulgaria) – which means that all the countries 
have really high levels of human development. According to Ilzetzki et al. (2013) fiscal 
multipliers should all be high for these economies which does not happen.  
Regarding the coefficient of debt level, the fact of being not significant may be explained 
by the conclusions in Sutherland (1997), since we have countries with very low levels of debt 
- less than 30% of GDP in Estonia, Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia, Lithuania - which may be 
skewing the results.   
Table 7. Effects of income inequality on government spending multipliers, EU 
(2004-2017) 
OLS estimates for 𝐹𝑀𝑛 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒_𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑛 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡_𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑛 +
𝛽4𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒_𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝐼𝐷𝐻𝑛 + 𝜀𝑛 (p-value in parenthesis) 
𝛼 𝛽1 𝛽2 𝛽3 𝛽4 𝑅
2 F-statistic 
1.866801 
(0.1421) 
-2.212986 
(0.0860) 
-0.227291 
(0.1806) 
0.001574 
(0.2439) 
-1.361245 
(0.2387) 
0.190369 1.293214 
(0.303172) 
 
Confirming results in Table 7, above, the higher income inequality is, the smaller will be 
the effects of a government spending shock on output. This result is statistically significant 
at 10%. Relying on a sample of developed countries, evidence for a negative relationship 
between the Gini coefficient and government spending multiplier is, however, dissimilar 
from the positive relationship found by Brinca et al. (2016). We tentatively find some possible 
explanations to this result, some related with more direct factors and other of more indirect 
nature. (1) First, a word of caution in interpreting these results: some fiscal multipliers assume 
values that are not expected, since we have estimated negative fiscal multipliers of shocks in 
government spending; moreover, the overall significance of the model falls out of the 90% 
confidence band (p-value of F-statistic is 0.303). (2) Still, results from Samanta and Cerf (2009) 
indicate a similar relationship as the one obtained here. The sample used in their study cover 
for transitional and developing countries, including some countries from our sample, namely, 
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Romania, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Latvia, Poland, and Lithuania. Besides the difference in the 
period of analysis, the inclusion of these countries may be biasing the results. (3) A third 
explanation may be attached with the composition of the expenditures. According with 
McKay and Reis (2016) transfers targeted to unemployed and poorer agents decrease 
inequality, also this kind of policy is more efficient. If the composition of government 
expenses is biased to targeted transfers then we expect lower inequality to be associated with 
higher effectiveness of the fiscal policy (inverse-causality though). (4) Additionally, Kumhof 
et al. (2015) associate higher inequality with higher leverage and, for instance, Kirchen et al. 
(2010) links high debt levels with worst fiscal multipliers, and thus we may conjecture a 
negative relationship between these two variables. If income inequality is one of the reasons 
to high debt levels, then its impact on fiscal multiplier will be negative; this argument may 
also help to explain why debt is not statistically significant as well, given that Gini may be 
capturing part of its effect on the multiplier. (5) Moreover, the monetary policy impact both 
on inequality (Auclert, 2017) and on fiscal multipliers (Christiano et al., 2011). Since monetary 
accommodation – followed by some policy makers over the past fewer years – lead to higher 
fiscal multipliers and it also has a redistributive impact, lowering income inequality, then it is 
expected a negative relationship between the two variables driven by monetary policy 
(inverted causality). 
We performed similar estimations, using multipliers of government revenues.  The 
baseline specification is poorly defined and yields no significance for the Gini coefficient 
(appendix A.2). When looking at the more complete model we still do not find significant 
results in a horizon of 1 year (appendix A.3). Notwithstanding, Gini becomes statistically 
significant at 5% (estimated p-value of 0.0350) when accounting for a two years (eight 
quarters) horizon in the more complete model, including the trade openness, the degree of 
development and the debt level as controls (see Table 8).  
Table 8. Effects of income inequality on government revenue multipliers, EU (2004-
2017) 
OLS estimates for 𝐹𝑀(𝑟𝑒𝑣)𝑛 = 𝛼(𝑟𝑒𝑣) + 𝛽1𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒_𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑛 +
𝛽3𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡_𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑛 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒_𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑛 + 𝜀(𝑟𝑒𝑣)𝑛 (p-value in parenthesis) 
𝛼 𝛽1 𝛽2 𝛽3 𝛽4 𝑅
2 F-statistic 
-5.908307 
(0.0553) 
6.589471 
(0.0350) 
0.058783 
(0.8820) 
-0.005775 
(0.0786) 
5.067645 
(0.0716) 
0.266119 1.994398 
(0.130611) 
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From this estimation we conclude for the statistical significance of three variables’ 
coefficients at a confidence level of 90%, being the coefficient associated with the trade 
openness the only one not significant. The main results are the following: positive impact of 
Gini index on fiscal (revenue) multiplier; negative relationship of debt level and positive 
impact of the degree of development on the fiscal (tax) multiplier. 
Relating these results with the literature, Batini et al. (2014) summarizes the results from 
several authors from that analysis we can relate higher fiscal multipliers with industrialized 
countries both in case of spending multipliers and revenue multipliers, this last case is 
consistently with our results - positive coefficient associated with the degree of development, 
based on HDI.9 On the opposite side, Suthernland (1997) relate lower fiscal multiplier with 
higher debt level pointing in the same directions as ours results. Regarding the result 
indicating not significance for the trade openness coefficient this may be related with a high 
marginal propensity to import associated with variation on taxes, it is expected little impact 
on trade openness since the transmission mechanism of a shock in taxes acts mainly through 
disposable income (Coenen et al., 2012) and, consequently, impacts closer to individual 
consumption and investment.  
Last but not least, from the analysis of the coefficient associated with Gini index 
(β1=6,589471) we find, once again, similar results to what was reported by Brinca et al. (2017). 
These results point for a higher multiplier associated with higher values of inequality, i.e., a 
unit increase on Gini coefficient leads to an improvement of, approximately, 6.59 euros on 
the effects on output per one euro increase in taxes. Economically the overall conclusion is 
that income inequality intensifies the response of output to a shock, due to its positive impact 
on fiscal multiplier. Thus, assuming that fiscal multipliers associated with revenues are 
negative, meaning that an increase in taxes leads to a decrease in product, a higher level of 
income inequality will lead to less recessive impacts; this conclusion meets the one found by 
Brinca et al. (2017) of a positive impact of income inequality in response to fiscal 
consolidation. 
 
  
                                                          
9 Using either GDP per capita or HDI in the estimation, indicating the degree of development the result point 
for the similar relationship (see appendix A.4).   
39 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Over the last years worldwide economies faced a fragile situation, driven by the 2008 
financial crisis. Policy makers notice the increscent importance of applying policies with the 
most efficient result. Focusing on European Union, we can notice a superior importance in 
fiscal policy, since monetary policy is centralized, “local” policy makers have to rely on fiscal 
policy to achieve better results for each country.    
Also the economic and political debate have always had a main concern regarding fiscal 
policy relate to the dual choice between economic efficiency and equity. The evidence of an 
unexpected increase in income inequality mainly in developed countries highlights the 
concerns of policy-makers. Usually the approach to this theme focus on the results of a fiscal 
policy in terms of inequality, however before that it is important to understand the impact 
of income inequality as a characteristic that may affect the effectiveness of the fiscal policy. 
Hence, to find out if the income inequality level may be a determinant of the effectiveness 
of fiscal policy it is crucial to measure the impact of some inequality indicator on the fiscal 
multiplier, both qualitatively and quantitatively.  
The analysis performed along this study is divided in two parts: a VAR model and an 
OLS model. The first part consists in a time series analysis to compute fiscal multipliers and 
after that based on the results to analyse the qualitative relationship between two groups of 
countries (below and above average of index coefficient) and the fiscal multipliers. In the 
second part we quantify this relationship, applying a least squares model to a cross sectional 
sample in which we regress Gini coefficients on fiscal multipliers. Our analysis is based on a 
sample of UE countries (excluding Luxembourg) and on the period between 2002 and 2017.  
Through the computation of the VAR model we reach impact (short run) and cumulative 
(long run) fiscal multipliers both for government expenditures and revenues. From these 
results we analyse the mentioned relationship, we get opposite outcomes for multipliers 
based on expenses and revenues. The results point to a negative impact in case of expenditure 
multiplier and the opposite one for revenues case.  
For the purpose of quantify the impact found we perform a least square model. To go 
further in the analysis, we also use other economic determinants of fiscal policy in order to 
understand if the impact remains similar in case where that factors are include. The 
accomplished results corroborate that obtained on the analysis based on time series data. The 
negative impact of Gini index in fiscal multipliers associated with expenses is also the result 
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of OLS model, and even bind if we consider trade openness, debt level and the degree of 
development in the estimation. Also the positive relationship associated before with Gini 
coefficient and revenue’s fiscal multiplier appear in this cross section analysis, and the 
inclusion of trade openness, degree of development and debt level does not change this 
result.  
Although the consistence between the two models applied, we can recognize some 
limitations of our analysis: first our fiscal multipliers results have unexpected signs, especially 
expenditures’ multipliers; also, the facts that our sample size is limited and has a lack of 
heterogeneity among countries; a third limitation is the use of aggregate of fiscal instruments 
that may have biased the results; finally the lack of accounting for inverted causality. For 
future works these are points that may be improved. For the first limitation, it can be simply 
settled by using multipliers already computed in former works. Regarding the sample issues, 
in a future work it is important to have countries with larger differences principally on income 
inequality indicator and the other point seems simply to improve and understand since size 
of the sample always matter for more consistent estimation. Also, the use of disaggregate 
instruments could give a better comprehension of the mechanisms implicit in these results. 
Lastly, the estimation may be reformulated in order to account for inverted causality, for 
instance by adding an instrumental variable. 
The most important conclusion on this study is to understand the extreme importance 
of consider the heterogeneity of agents when looking for the fiscal policy with the greater 
effectiveness. Namely, in what concerns to income inequality since our results point to an 
impact of this feature. So policy makers should consider the distribution of income not only 
as a goal to be reach with different policies but a determinant of its effectiveness. 
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Annex  
 
A.1 Effects of income inequality on government spending 
multipliers, EU (baseline model, 2002-2017) 
Dependent Variable: FISCAL_MULTIPLIER  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 06/10/18   Time: 18:12   
Sample: 1 28 IF COUNTRY<>"Luxembourg"  
Included observations: 27   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.300991 0.291793 1.031521 0.3122 
GINI_INDEX -0.952008 0.967402 -0.984087 0.3345 
     
     R-squared 0.037292    Mean dependent var 0.016031 
Adjusted R-squared -0.001216    S.D. dependent var 0.186785 
S.E. of regression 0.186898    Akaike info criterion -0.445317 
Sum squared resid 0.873274    Schwarz criterion -0.349329 
Log likelihood 8.011780    Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.416775 
F-statistic 0.968427    Durbin-Watson stat 1.825167 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.334501    
     
     
 
A.2 Effects of income inequality on government revenue 
multipliers, EU (baseline model, 2002-2017) 
Dependent Variable: FISCAL_MULTIPLIER  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 06/10/18   Time: 18:27   
Sample: 1 28 IF COUNTRY<>"Luxembourg"  
Included observations: 27   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -0.212265 0.375072 -0.565931 0.5765 
GINI_INDEX 0.905581 1.243503 0.728250 0.4732 
     
     R-squared 0.020773    Mean dependent var 0.058798 
Adjusted R-squared -0.018396    S.D. dependent var 0.238060 
S.E. of regression 0.240240    Akaike info criterion 0.056829 
Sum squared resid 1.442879    Schwarz criterion 0.152817 
Log likelihood 1.232807    Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.085371 
F-statistic 0.530348    Durbin-Watson stat 1.629087 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.473227    
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A.3 Cross-Section Estimation (Revenue Fiscal Multiplier (1Y); 
Trade openness; Debt level and IDH), 2002-2017 
Dependent Variable: FISCAL_MULTIPLIER  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 09/05/18   Time: 21:12   
Sample: 1 28 IF COUNTRY<>"Luxembourg"  
Included observations: 27   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -2.200603 1.502041 -1.465075 0.1570 
GINI_INDEX 1.902643 1.508508 1.261274 0.2204 
TRADE_OPENESS -0.170218 0.201358 -0.845352 0.4070 
DEBT_LEVEL -0.003448 0.001610 -2.141509 0.0436 
DEGREE_OF_DEVELOP_ID 2.339331 1.376948 1.698925 0.1034 
     
     R-squared 0.251841    Mean dependent var 0.058798 
Adjusted R-squared 0.115812    S.D. dependent var 0.238060 
S.E. of regression 0.223851    Akaike info criterion 0.009903 
Sum squared resid 1.102403    Schwarz criterion 0.249873 
Log likelihood 4.866306    Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.081259 
F-statistic 1.851381    Durbin-Watson stat 2.077051 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.154989    
     
     
 
A.4 Cross-Section Estimation (Revenue Fiscal Multiplier (2Y); 
Trade openness, Debt level and GDP per capita), 2002-2017 
 
Dependent Variable: FISCAL_MULTIPLIER  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 08/27/18   Time: 20:40   
Sample: 1 28 IF COUNTRY<>"Luxembourg"  
Included observations: 27   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -1.653188 1.076431 -1.535805 0.1388 
GINI_INDEX 5.785714 2.857050 2.025066 0.0552 
TRADE_OPENESS 0.012310 0.395804 0.031101 0.9755 
DEBT_LEVEL -0.005728 0.003221 -1.778445 0.0892 
DEGREE_OF_DEVELOPMENT 0.014183 0.008769 1.617421 0.1200 
     
     R-squared 0.237255    Mean dependent var 0.060743 
Adjusted R-squared 0.098574    S.D. dependent var 0.467264 
S.E. of regression 0.443637    Akaike info criterion 1.377954 
Sum squared resid 4.329895    Schwarz criterion 1.617924 
Log likelihood -13.60238    Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.449310 
F-statistic 1.710794    Durbin-Watson stat 2.444951 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.183510    
     
     
 
